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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) investigation into Playpen, a global 
online forum that existed on the dark web1 and that was 
                                              
 1 “The dark web is a private global computer network 
that enables users to conduct anonymous transactions without 
revealing any trace of their location.”  Ahmed 
Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement 
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dedicated to the advertisement and distribution of child 
pornography.  The website had a substantial amount of users.  
In fact, more than 150,000 users collectively engaged in over 
95,000 posts with over 9,000 forum topics related to child 
pornography.  This appeal centers on the FBI’s decision to rely 
on a single search warrant, issued in the Eastern District of 
Virginia (“EDVA”), to search the computers of thousands of 
Playpen users across the United States and the world using a 
form of government-created malware termed a “Network 
Investigative Technique” (“NIT”).  
 Appellant Gabriel Werdene, a citizen of Pennsylvania, 
was a Playpen user whose computer was compromised by the 
NIT.  Subsequently, he was charged in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania (“EDPA”) with one count of possessing child 
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  He 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search 
of his computer, including the information revealed by the use 
of the NIT.  The District Court denied the suppression motion, 
holding that the NIT warrant violated the version of Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41(b) then in effect (“Rule 41(b)”)2, but that the NIT 
                                              
Jurisdiction on the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1087 
(2017). 
 2 The NIT warrant was issued on February 20, 2015.  On 
December 1, 2016, Rule 41(b) was amended to authorize 
magistrate judges to issue warrants to search computers and 
seize or copy electronically stored information located outside 
the magistrate judge’s district if the district where the computer 
or information is located has been concealed through 
technological means.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(6).  That Rule, 
which authorizes warrants such as the NIT warrant here, is not 
at issue in this appeal, and the references to “Rule 41(b)” 
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itself did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment 
and that Werdene was not prejudiced by the error.  On appeal, 
Werdene contends that the District Court erred in holding that 
no Fourth Amendment search took place.  Further, he argues 
that the issuance of the warrant violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights because it lacked particularity and was issued in 
violation of the jurisdictional requirements set forth in both 
Rule 41(b) and the Federal Magistrates Act.  The Government 
concedes that a Fourth Amendment search occurred, but 
contends that the NIT was authorized by Rule 41(b)(4) and 
that, in any event, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule precludes suppression.     
 We hold that the NIT warrant violated the prior version 
of Rule 41(b) and that the magistrate judge exceeded her 
authority under the Federal Magistrates Act.  The warrant was 
therefore void ab initio, and the Rule 41(b) infraction rose to 
the level of a Fourth Amendment violation.  However, we 
agree with the Government that the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule may apply to warrants that are void ab initio, 
which ultimately precludes suppression in this case.  We 
therefore will affirm on alternative grounds the District Court’s 
decision to deny Werdene’s suppression motion.  
  
                                              
throughout this opinion thus refer only to the prior version of 
the Rule. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 To inform our forthcoming analysis, we shall detail how 
Playpen escaped traditional law enforcement detection and 
how the FBI circumvented the dark web to apprehend its users.  
A. Tor 
 The Playpen site operated on the anonymous “The 
Onion Router” (“Tor”) network—a constituent part of the 
“dark web”—which allows users to conceal their actual 
internet protocol (“IP”) addresses while accessing the internet.3  
An IP address is a unique identifier assigned by an internet 
service provider to every computer having access to the 
internet, including computer servers that host websites.  
Websites that the computer user visits can log the computer’s 
IP address, creating a digital record of activity on each website.  
After lawful seizure of an illicit website under normal 
circumstances, law enforcement is able to retrieve the 
website’s IP log to locate and apprehend its users.   
 Tor, however, prevents websites from registering a 
computer’s actual IP address by sending user communications 
through a network of relay computers called “nodes” up until 
those communications reach the website.  Numerous 
                                              
 3 Tor was developed by the U.S. Naval research 
Laboratory, and is now made available to the public at large.  
It is used by myriad individuals, groups and institutions 
concerned with digital privacy: journalists, military personnel, 
lawyers, activists, governments, corporations, and those 
engaged in nefarious enterprises.   
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intermediary computers therefore stand between the accessing 
computer and the website, and the website can log the IP 
address of only the “exit node”, which is the final computer in 
the sequence.  Accordingly, Playpen’s IP log—like that of 
other Tor websites—contained only the IP addresses of the exit 
nodes, rendering traditional IP identification techniques 
useless.   
B. The Playpen Investigation 
 In December 2014, a foreign law enforcement agency 
informed the FBI that Playpen was being hosted by a computer 
server in North Carolina.  Playpen’s administrator was 
identified as a person residing in Florida, who was promptly 
arrested.4  The FBI then lawfully seized the server, moved it to 
a government facility in EDVA, and obtained a wiretap order 
to monitor communications on it.  It then assumed 
administrative control of Playpen and allowed the website to 
operate while law enforcement officials tried to circumvent 
Tor and identify Playpen’s users.  
 The FBI’s solution was the NIT, a form of government-
created malware that allowed the FBI to retrieve identifying 
information from Playpen users located all around the world.  
                                              
 4 The Playpen administrator was responsible for, inter 
alia, the distribution of child pornography, monitoring the 
website’s activity and content, facilitating private messages 
between users, instructing users how to evade detection by law 
enforcement, and periodically changing the website’s address 
to bypass discovery.   
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The NIT’s deployment worked in multiple steps.  First, the FBI 
modified Playpen’s code so that each accessing computer—
unknowingly to the user and no matter the computer’s physical 
location—downloaded the NIT whenever a “user or 
administrator log[ged] into [Playpen] by entering a username 
and password.”  App. 133.  Once downloaded, the NIT 
searched the accessing computer for seven discrete pieces of 
identifying information: (1) an IP address; (2) a unique 
identifier to distinguish the data from that of other computers; 
(3) the type of operating system; (4) information about whether 
the NIT had already been delivered; (5) a Host Name; (6) an 
active operating system username; and (7) a Media Access 
Control address.  Finally, the NIT transmitted this information 
back to a government-controlled computer in EDVA.  The FBI 
postulated that it could then rely on this information to identify 
users’ premises and distinguish their computers from other 
computers located within their proximity.   
 In February 2015, the FBI obtained a search warrant 
from a magistrate judge in EDVA to deploy the NIT to all 
“activating computers.”  App. 106.  An “activating computer” 
was defined in the search warrant as the computer of “any user 
or administrator who logs into [Playpen] by entering a 
username and password.”  Id.  Further, the NIT could be 
deployed to any activating computer “wherever located.”  App. 
136 (emphasis added).  In other words, this single warrant 
authorized the FBI to retrieve identifying information from 
computers all across the United States, and from all around the 
world.  Most importantly, these computers were 
overwhelmingly located outside of EDVA. 
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C. Charges Against Werdene and Suppression Motion 
 Analysis of the NIT data revealed the IP address of a 
Playpen user, eventually identified as Werdene, residing in 
Bensalem, Pennsylvania.  In the final month of the website’s 
operation, Werdene was logged in for approximately ten hours 
and made six text postings, commenting on child pornography 
and sharing links under the username “thepervert.”  The FBI 
obtained a separate search warrant for Werdene’s home from a 
magistrate judge in EDPA, where agents seized one USB drive 
and one DVD containing child pornography.5   
 In September 2015, Werdene was charged in EDPA 
with one count of possessing child pornography, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  He filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized during the search of his computer, 
including the information revealed by the NIT, the evidence 
subsequently seized from his home, and statements that he later 
made to the FBI.  Werdene argued that the warrant was issued 
in violation of the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Rule 
41(b), and that suppression was required because the violation 
was constitutional in nature and the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule did not apply.  The Government did not 
contend that the NIT warrant was explicitly authorized by Rule 
41(b), but argued that the rule was flexible and expansive, and 
                                              
 5 Werdene does not contest the lawfulness of this search 
warrant issued in EDPA.  See Appellant Br. at 15 (“The only 
contested issue in this case [is] the lawfulness of the search of 
Mr. Werdene’s computer, via the NIT, pursuant to the warrant 
issued in the Eastern District of Virginia.”).  
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included warrants based on technological advances—such as 
the NIT warrant—which came within the spirit of the rule.   
 The District Court denied the motion in a memorandum 
and order issued on May 18, 2016.  It first held that the NIT 
warrant violated Rule 41(b) because the magistrate judge in 
EDVA was without authority to issue a warrant to search 
Werdene’s computer in EDPA.  But the District Court also held 
that the NIT was not a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment because Werdene lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to his computer’s IP address.  It 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated, and 
that the Rule 41(b) violation was only “technical” in nature.  
The District Court therefore denied the suppression motion on 
the bases that the Government did not intentionally disregard 
the Rule’s requirements and that Werdene was not prejudiced 
by the violation.  This appeal followed. 
 On June 7, 2016, Werdene pled guilty pursuant to a plea 
agreement in which he reserved his right to appeal the District 
Court’s ruling on the suppression motion.  On September 7, 
2016, the District Court accepted the recommendation of the 
U.S. Probation Office and applied a downward variance from 
the United States Federal Sentencing Guideline’s range of 51-
63 months.  It sentenced Werdene to 24 months’ imprisonment, 
a term of supervised release of five years, and restitution in the 
amount of $1,500.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had original jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Our jurisdiction arises from 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review the District Court’s denial of a 
motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying 
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factual determinations but exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s application of law to those facts.”  United 
States v. Murray, 821 F.3d 386, 390–91 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011)).  
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 This case requires us to decide a multitude of issues 
regarding Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment.  First, we must 
determine whether the NIT warrant violated Rule 41.  If it did 
not, then we will affirm the District Court because there is no 
basis to grant Werdene’s suppression motion.  Second, if it did 
violate Rule 41, then we are required to decide whether the 
breach rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation.  To 
do so, we consider whether the NIT warrant, by being issued 
by a magistrate judge beyond her jurisdiction, was void ab 
initio and, if so, whether such a transgression constituted a 
Fourth Amendment violation in the founding era.  See Virginia 
v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008).  If we do not find that a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred, then the suppression 
motion must be denied unless Werdene can prove that he was 
prejudiced by the error or that the FBI acted with intentional 
and deliberate disregard for Rule 41.  See United States v. 
Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122, 136 (3d Cir. 1988), overruled 
in part on other grounds by United States v. Chapple, 985 F.2d 
729 (3d Cir. 1993).  Third, if a Fourth Amendment violation 
did occur, then we are called upon to decide an issue of first 
impression for this Court: whether the good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule applies when a warrant is void ab initio.  
If it does not, then we apply the exclusionary rule without 
consideration of the good-faith exception.  Fourth, if the good-
faith exception does apply, then we must determine if it 
precludes suppression in this case.  
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 For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the NIT 
warrant violated Rule 41(b).  As a result, the magistrate judge 
not only exceeded her authority under the Rule as then drafted, 
but also under the Federal Magistrates Act, rendering the 
warrant void ab initio and raising the magnitude of the 
infraction from a technical one to a Fourth Amendment 
violation.  On the other hand, we also hold that the good-faith 
exception applies to such warrants, which, given the 
circumstances of this case, precludes suppression.  We 
therefore will affirm on alternative grounds the District Court’s 
decision to deny Werdene’s suppression motion. 
A. Federal Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction 
 The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a), 
authorizes federal magistrate judges to exercise the “powers 
and duties conferred . . . by the Rules of Criminal Procedure” 
in three geographic areas: “[1] within the district in which 
sessions are held by the court that appointed the magistrate 
judge, [2] at other places where that court may function, and 
[3] elsewhere as authorized by law.”  § 636(a); see also United 
States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1118 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Accordingly, § 636(a) creates 
“jurisdictional limitations on the power of magistrate judges” 
because it “expressly and independently limits where those 
powers will be effective.”  Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1119 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also United States v. Hazlewood, 
526 F.3d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 2008) (“In the Federal Magistrates 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, Congress conferred jurisdiction to 
federal magistrate-judge[s]”); N.L.R.B. v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 
39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[F]ederal magistrates are 
creatures of [§ 636(a)], and so is their jurisdiction.”); Gov’t of 
Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cr. 1989) 
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(“The jurisdiction of federal magistrates is defined by the 
Federal Magistrates Act.”).  
 While § 636(a) defines the geographic scope of a 
magistrate judge’s powers, the Rules of Criminal Procedure—
including Rule 41(b)—define what those powers are.  See 
§ 636(a)(1); see also Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1119 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring).  Rule 41(b) provides that a magistrate judge may 
“issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property 
located within the district.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(1).  At the 
time that the NIT warrant was issued, the Rule also authorized 
four exceptions to this territorial restriction: (1) for property 
that might be moved outside the district before the warrant is 
executed, Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(2); (2) for terrorism 
investigations, Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(3); (3) to install a 
tracking device within the magistrate judge’s district that may 
track the movement of property outside that district, Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41(b)(4); and (4) to search and seize property located 
outside any district but within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(5).  Notably, “[n]one of these 
[Rule 41(b)] exceptions expressly allow a magistrate judge in 
one jurisdiction to authorize the search of a computer in a 
different jurisdiction.”  United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 
1047 (8th Cir. 2017). 
B. The NIT Warrant Violated Rule 41(b) 
 We must first determine whether the NIT warrant 
violated Rule 41(b).  The Government conceded below that 
“[a]lthough Rule 41 does authorize a judge to issue a search 
warrant for a search in another district in some circumstances, 
it does not explicitly do so in these circumstances.”  App. 91 
(Government Br. in Opposition to Motion to Suppress) 
(emphasis added).  Given the concession, the Government 
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instead argued that the Rule set forth an illustrative, rather than 
exhaustive, list of circumstances in which a magistrate judge 
may issue a warrant.   
 On appeal, however, the Government curiously has 
reversed course, and now contends that the NIT was in fact 
explicitly authorized by Rule 41(b)(4), which provides that a 
magistrate judge may “issue a warrant to install within the 
district a tracking device; the warrant may authorize use of the 
device to track the movement of a person or property located 
within the district, outside the district, or both.”  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 41(b)(4) (emphasis added).   
 According to the Government, under this Rule, “the 
NIT warrant properly authorized use of the NIT to track the 
movement of information—the digital child pornography 
content requested by users who logged into Playpen’s 
website—as it traveled from the server in [EDVA] through the 
encrypted Tor network to its final destination: the users’ 
computers, wherever located.”  Government Br. at 30.  At that 
point, the NIT caused the Playpen users’ computers to transmit 
the identifying information back to the FBI over the open 
internet, thus enabling law enforcement to locate and identify 
the user.  In the Government’s estimation, the NIT is similar to 
a transmitter affixed to an automobile that is programmed to 
send location-enabling signals (like GPS coordinates) back to 
a government-controlled receiver because it was designed to 
send location-enabling information (like an actual IP address) 
back to a government-controlled computer.  “Thus, although 
not a physical beeper affixed to a tangible object [as was the 
case in, for example, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 
(1984)], the NIT operated as a digital tracking device of 
intangible information within the meaning of Rule 41(b)(4).”  
Id. at 32.    
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 We need not resolve Werdene’s contention that the 
Government waived this argument because we find that the 
Government’s tracking device analogy is inapposite.  As an 
initial matter, it is clear that the FBI did not believe that the 
NIT was a tracking device at the time that it sought the warrant.  
Warrants issued under Rule 41(b)(4) are specialized 
documents that are denominated “Tracking Warrant” and 
require the Government to submit a specialized “Application 
for a Tracking Warrant.”  See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. 
COURTS, CRIMINAL FORMS AO 102 (2009) & AO 104 (2016).  
Here, the FBI did not submit an application for a tracking 
warrant – rather, it applied for, and received, a standard search 
warrant.  Indeed, the term “tracking device” is absent from the 
NIT warrant application and supporting affidavit.   
 More importantly, the analogy does not withstand 
scrutiny.  The explicit purpose of the warrant was not to track 
movement—as would be required under Rule 41(b)(4)—but to 
“obtain[] information” from “activating computers.”  App. 
106.  As discussed above, the NIT was designed to search—
not track—the user’s computer for the IP address and other 
identifying information, and to transmit that data back to a 
government-controlled server.  Although the seized 
information (mainly the IP address) assisted the FBI in 
identifying a user, it provided no information as to the 
computer’s or user’s precise and contemporary physical 
location.  This fact—that the NIT did not track movement—is 
dispositive, because Rule 41(b)(4) is “based on the 
understanding that the device will assist officers only in 
tracking the movements of a person or object.”  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 41 Advisory Committee’s Note (2006) (emphasis added); 
see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a)(2)(E) (incorporating the 
definition of “tracking device” from 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b), 
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which is “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the 
tracking of the movement of a person or object.”  18 U.S.C. § 
3117(b) (emphasis added)).  The NIT, by not 
contemporaneously transmitting the location of the computers 
that it searched, was therefore unlike the quintessential 
tracking device that the Government used in United v. Jones, 
which “track[ed] the vehicle’s movements . . . [b]y means of 
signals from multiple satellites, the device established the 
vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated 
that location by cellular phone to a Government computer.”  
565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (emphasis added).   
 Furthermore, Rule 41(b)(4) requires that a tracker be 
“install[ed] within the district.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(4).  It 
is difficult to imagine a scenario where the NIT was “installed” 
on Werdene’s computer—which was physically located in 
Pennsylvania—in EDVA.  The Eighth Circuit, which is the 
only other Court of Appeals to address the Government’s Rule 
41(b)(4) argument to date, rejected it on this basis: 
The government argues that the defendants made 
a “virtual” trip to the Eastern District of Virginia 
to access child pornography and that 
investigators “installed” the NIT within that 
district.  Although plausible, this argument is 
belied by how the NIT actually worked: it was 
installed on the defendants’ computers in their 
homes in Iowa. . . . [W]e agree with the district 
court that the “virtual trip” fiction “stretches the 
rule too far.” 
Horton, 863 F.3d at 1047-48 (citations omitted).   
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 The Government correctly contends that Rule 41 should 
be read flexibly “to include within its scope electronic 
intrusions authorized upon a finding of probable cause” so that 
it can keep up with technological innovations.  United States v. 
New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 (1977).  However, as the 
District Court aptly stated, “[e]ven a flexible application of the 
Rule . . . is insufficient to allow the Court to read into it powers 
possessed by the magistrate that are clearly not contemplated 
and do not fit into any of the five subsections.”  United States 
v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  For the 
aforementioned reasons, the NIT was not a “tracking device” 
under Rule 41(b)(4), and therefore the warrant violated the 
Rule.6 
C. The NIT Warrant Violated the Fourth Amendment 
 Since the NIT warrant violated Rule 41(b), we next 
consider the nature of the violation to assess if suppression is 
warranted.  See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (“There are two categories of Rule 41 violations: 
those involving constitutional violations, and all others.”).  If 
the violation is “constitutional”—i.e., a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment—then suppression is governed by the 
                                              
 6 Having found that a Rule 41(b) violation occurred, we 
need not reach here Werdene’s argument that the NIT warrant 
fails the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, 
codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A).  See Horton, 863 F.3d 
at 1049 n.4 (“Because we find that the NIT warrant failed to 
meet constitutional standards on alternative grounds, we 
decline to address [the particularity] issue.”).   
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exclusionary rule standards applicable to Fourth Amendment 
violations generally.  See Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d at 136; see 
also United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“The exclusionary rule is a prudential doctrine designed to 
enforce the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).  If, however, the 
violation is not of constitutional magnitude, but rather is 
“ministerial” or “technical” in nature, then suppression is 
warranted only if “(1) there was ‘prejudice’ in the sense that 
the search might not have occurred or would not have been so 
abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence 
of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the 
Rule.”  Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d at 136 (quoting United States 
v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 The Fourth Amendment guarantees that: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.   
 “[T]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is 
to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted 
intrusion by the State.” Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 228 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
767 (1966)); see also United States v. Pollard, 326 F.3d 397, 
410 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The Fourth Amendment’s ‘central 
concern . . . is to protect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and 
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oppressive interference by government officials.’” (quoting 
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975))).  The Fourth 
Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and the Supreme Court has counseled that the Fourth 
Amendment encompasses “at a minimum, the degree of 
protection it afforded when it was adopted.”  Jones, 565 U.S. 
at 411.  Accordingly, “[w]e look to the statutes and common 
law of the founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth 
Amendment was meant to preserve.”  Moore, 553 U.S. at 168; 
see also United States v. Phillips, 834 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th 
Cir. 2016).    
 We must therefore determine whether the 
circumstances of this case constituted a Fourth Amendment 
violation during the founding era.7  “The principle animating 
                                              
 7 The District Court wrongly concluded that the Rule 
41(b) violation did not violate the Fourth Amendment because 
Werdene had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP 
address, and accordingly, that the NIT did not conduct a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Both 
parties agree that this was error, and the Government explicitly 
disavows this portion of the District Court’s ruling.  The NIT 
obtained the IP address and other identifying information from 
Werdene’s home computer and not from a third party, and 
Werdene had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home 
computer.  See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 
190 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Individuals generally possess a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their home computers.”); Guest v. 
Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Home owners would 
of course have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
homes and in their belongings—including computers—inside 
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the common law at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s 
framing was clear: a warrant may travel only so far as the 
power of its issuing official.”  Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1124 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).  The NIT warrant clearly violated 
this precept.  The magistrate judge not only exceeded the 
territorial scope of Rule 41(b), but, as a result of that violation, 
she also exceeded the jurisdiction that § 636(a) imposes on 
magistrate judges.  Under § 636(a), the magistrate judge was 
only authorized to exercise the powers of Rule 41(b) under 
three circumstances: (1) “within the district” that appointed her 
– i.e., EDVA, (2) “at other places where [EDVA] may 
function”, and (3) “elsewhere as authorized by law.”  § 636(a).  
Pennsylvania obviously does not fall within the confines of 
EDVA or its places of function, and we have already held that 
Rule 41(b) did not authorize the NIT warrant.   
 The NIT warrant was therefore void ab initio because it 
violated § 636(a)’s jurisdictional limitations and was not 
authorized by any positive law.8  See United States v. Master, 
614 F.3d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen a warrant is signed 
by someone who lacks the legal authority necessary to issue 
search warrants, the warrant is void ab initio.” (quoting United 
States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also 
Horton, 863 F.3d at 1049 (“[T]he NIT warrant was void ab 
initio . . . .”); United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144, 1147 (10th 
                                              
the home.”).  The deployment of the NIT therefore constituted 
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.  
 8 As previously noted, the state of authorizing positive 
law for NIT searches has since changed with the promulgation 
of Rule 41(b)(6).  See supra note 2. 
20 
 
Cir. 1990) (suppressing evidence of search on Indian land 
because state court lacked authority to issue search warrant).   
 It follows that the Rule 41(b) violation was of 
constitutional magnitude because “at the time of the framing . 
. . a warrant issued for a search or seizure beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of a magistrate’s powers under positive law was 
treated as no warrant at all.”  Krueger, 809 F.3d at 1123 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Engleman v. Deputy 
Murray, 546 F.3d 944, 948-49 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Under a 
historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment, the 
jurisdiction of the issuing judge and the executing officer is 
limited, and a warrant is not valid if an officer acts outside of 
that limited jurisdiction.”).   
 The Government retorts that the NIT warrant was valid 
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment because it met the 
Supreme Court’s three constitutional requirements for validity: 
it was “(1) supported by probable cause, (2) sufficiently 
particular, and (3) issued by a neutral and detached 
magistrate.”  Government Br. at 36 (citing Dalia v. United 
States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)).  Furthermore, the 
Government frames Rule 41(b) as a venue provision that is 
entirely procedural in nature and not substantive – accordingly, 
because the Fourth Amendment is silent about the proper 
venue for applying for a search warrant, a Rule 41(b) violation 
can “only rarely [be] deemed constitutional.”  Id. at 38.  But 
none of this overcomes our dispositive finding that the 
magistrate judge acted outside of her jurisdiction under § 
636(a).  As the D.C. Circuit aptly put it, “[e]ven if we assume 
that an imperfect authorizing order could be thought facially 
sufficient, we do not see how a blatant disregard of a . . . 
judge’s jurisdictional limitation can be regarded as only 
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‘technical.’”  United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 515 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013).9 
D. The Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception 
 Having established that a Fourth Amendment violation 
occurred, we must now address an issue of first impression for 
this Court: does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule apply when a warrant is void ab initio due to the magistrate 
judge lacking jurisdiction to issue it?  We must consider the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule to address this inquiry.  See 
United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 635, 640 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(considering “the extent to which the violation . . . undermined 
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment” when applying 
exclusionary rule).   
 The exclusionary rule is a prudential doctrine that 
“prevent[s] the government from relying at trial on evidence 
obtained in violation of the [Fourth] Amendment’s strictures.”  
Franz, 772 F.3d at 145.  However, the rule is not intended to 
remedy Fourth Amendment violations, and does not 
necessarily apply each time a violation occurs.  See Herring v. 
                                              
 9 The Government also contends that the NIT warrant 
was not void ab initio because it could validly be executed to 
search computers within EDVA.  We reject this argument – the 
fact that Rule 41(b) may have permitted a more limited warrant 
confined solely to EDVA has no bearing on the fatal 
jurisdictional issues that plagued the actual NIT warrant.  See 
Horton, 863 F.3d at 1049 (collecting cases) (“The possibility 
that the magistrate [judge] could have executed a proper 
warrant in the Eastern District of Virginia, however, does not 
save this warrant from its jurisdictional error.”).   
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United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009).  Put differently, 
“there is no constitutional right to have the evidentiary fruits of 
an illegal search or seizure suppressed at trial.”  United States 
v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc); see 
United States v. Davis, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) (noting that 
the Fourth Amendment “says nothing about suppressing 
evidence obtained in violation of [its] command.”); United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (“[T]he use of fruits 
of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth 
Amendment wrong.’” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 354 (1974))).   
 Rather, the exclusionary rule aims to deter government 
violations of the Fourth Amendment.  See Krueger, 809 F.3d 
at 1125 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Even when an 
unreasonable search does exist, the Supreme Court has 
explained, we must be persuaded that ‘appreciable deterrence’ 
of police misconduct can be had before choosing suppression 
as the right remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation.” 
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 141)); see also Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is 
calculated to prevent, not repair.”).  Accordingly, “[i]n 
determining whether the exclusionary rule applies, we engage 
in a cost-benefit analysis, balancing the ‘deterrence benefits of 
suppression’ against its ‘substantial social costs.’”  Franz, 772 
F.3d at 145 (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 236).  These costs 
“almost always require[] courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy 
evidence bearing on guilt or innocence” of the defendant and 
“in many cases . . . to suppress the truth and set the criminal 
loose in the community without punishment.”  Davis, 564 U.S. 
229, 237 (2011).  As a result, “[s]uppression of evidence . . . 
has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”  Hudson 
v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). 
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 In Katzin, we explained how the good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule effectuates this balance:  
Where the particular facts of a case indicate that 
law enforcement officers act[ed] with an 
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that 
their conduct [was] lawful, or when their conduct 
involve[d] only simple, isolated negligence, 
there is no illicit conduct to deter.  In such 
circumstances, the deterrence rationale loses 
much of its force and exclusion cannot pay its 
way.  Alternatively, where law enforcement 
conduct is deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent or involves recurring or systemic 
negligence, deterrence holds greater value and 
often outweighs the associated costs.   
769 F.3d at 171 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  We also acknowledged that the Supreme Court has 
applied the good-faith exception “across a range of cases.”  Id. 
(quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at 238); see, e.g.,  Davis, 564 U.S. at 
241 (good-faith exception applicable when warrant is invalid 
due to later-reversed binding appellate precedent); Herring, 
555 U.S. at 147-48 (undiscovered error in police-maintained 
database); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1995) 
(undiscovered error in court-maintained database); Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (subsequently overturned 
statute); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 980 (1984) 
(judicial clerical error on warrant); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 
(later-invalidated warrant). 
 On appeal, Werdene contends that the good-faith 
exception should not apply when a Fourth Amendment 
violation arises from a warrant that was void ab initio.  He 
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argues that the common theme in all of the Supreme Court’s 
good-faith cases is that police reasonably relied on some 
positive law that was appropriately issued, even though it was 
later invalidated.  According to Werdene, each of those 
sources—i.e., a warrant, a statute, binding case law, or non-
binding case law—had the force of law, but a warrant that is 
void ab initio is different because “[a]ll proceedings of a court 
beyond its jurisdiction are void.”  Appellant Br. at 49 (quoting 
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 197 (1830)).          
 However, the fundamental flaw with Werdene’s 
argument is that it does not appreciate the distinction between 
the validity of the warrant and the deterrence rationale of the 
exclusionary rule and the good-faith exception.  Implicit in his 
argument is the assumption that where “the magistrate lacks 
authority to issue the contested warrant, the supposed ‘good 
faith’ of the officer who executes the warrant can do nothing 
to confer legal status upon the [void] warrant.”  Master, 614 
F.3d at 242.  But “whether to suppress evidence under the 
exclusionary rule is a separate question from whether the 
Government has violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.”  Katzin, 769 F.3d at 170; see also Master, 614 F.3d at 
242 (“[T]he decision to exclude evidence is divorced from 
whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.”).  
 Thus, in each of the Supreme Court’s good-faith 
exception cases, “the Court has not focused on the type of 
Fourth Amendment violation at issue, but rather confined the 
‘good-faith inquiry . . . to the objectively ascertainable question 
whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known 
that the search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of the 
circumstances.’”  Horton, 863 F.3d at 1051 (quoting Herring, 
555 U.S. at 145).  We therefore hold that the good-faith 
exception applies to warrants that are void ab initio because 
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“the issuing magistrate’s lack of authority has no impact on 
police misconduct, if the officers mistakenly, but 
inadvertently, presented the warrant to an innocent 
magistrate.”  Master, 614 F.3d at 242.10     
 Having determined that the good-faith exception is 
applicable, we turn to whether it precludes suppression in this 
case.  Here, the FBI sought and received a warrant, and we 
have identified only four scenarios in which reliance on a 
warrant is unreasonable:  
 
(1) the magistrate issued the warrant in 
reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false 
affidavit; 
 
(2) the magistrate abandoned his judicial role 
and failed to perform his neutral and detached 
function; 
                                              
 10 The First, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have 
each applied the good-faith exception to NIT cases.  See United 
States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 689 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven 
if the NIT warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, 
the Leon good faith exception precludes suppression of the 
evidence.”); United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 324 (1st Cir. 
2017) (“[B]ecause the government acted in good faith reliance 
on the NIT warrant . . . suppression is not warranted.”); Horton, 
863 F.3d at 1050 (“Our review of relevant Supreme Court 
precedent leads us to . . . conclu[de] that the [good-faith] 
exception can apply to warrants void ab initio like this one.”); 
United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313, 1319-21 (“The 
district court did not apply the [good-faith] exception, 
mistakenly thinking that it did not apply.”).  
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(3) the warrant was based on an affidavit so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable; or 
 
(4) the warrant was so facially deficient that 
it failed to particularize the place to be searched 
or the things to be seized. 
 
United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 664 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 561 n.19 (3d 
Cir. 2010)).  The first three scenarios are entirely inapplicable 
here – Werdene contends only that the NIT warrant was 
facially deficient because it allegedly did not identify the 
location to be searched.  But the NIT warrant adequately 
described the “Place to be Searched” as the “activating 
computers . . . of any user or administrator who logs into 
[Playpen] by entering a username and password,” and it 
described the “Information to be Seized . . . from any 
‘activating’ computer’” as seven discrete pieces of 
information.  App. 106-07.  The warrant was therefore far from 
facially deficient because it specified which computers would 
be searched and what information would be retrieved.  See 
United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(“Nor was the [NIT] warrant so ‘facially deficient . . . that the 
executing officers [could not] reasonably presume it to be 
valid.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 923)); United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 323 (1st Cir. 
2017) (same). 
 
 Here, the NIT warrant was issued by a neutral and 
detached, duly appointed magistrate judge, who 
determined that the warrant was supported by probable 
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cause and particularly described the places to be searched 
and things to be seized.  This, on its own, is sufficient for 
us to determine that the FBI acted in good-faith, especially 
because there is no evidence that it exceeded the scope of 
the warrant.  See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (“‘[A] warrant issued 
by a magistrate normally suffices to establish’ that a law 
enforcement officer has ‘acted in good faith in conducting the 
search.’” (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823, 
n.32 (1982))); see also Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 663 (“Ordinarily, 
the ‘mere existence of a warrant . . . suffices to prove that an 
officer conducted a search in good faith.’” (quoting Stearn, 597 
F.3d at 561)).   
 
 The Rule 41(b) error, therefore, was committed by the 
magistrate judge, not the FBI agents who reasonably relied on 
the NIT warrant, and we have repeatedly recognized that 
“officer[s] normally should not be penalized for the 
magistrate’s mistake.” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 244 (3d 
Cir. 2004); see also United States v. $ 92,422.57, 307 F.3d 137, 
152 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a Magistrate Judge has [issued a 
warrant], law enforcement officers, who are rarely attorneys, 
are entitled to rely on the Magistrate Judge’s judgment”).  
 More importantly, the exclusionary rule “applies only 
where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’”  Herring, 555 
U.S. at 141 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909) (emphasis added).  
Thus, even though Rule 41(b) did not authorize the magistrate 
judge to issue the NIT warrant, future law enforcement officers 
may apply for and obtain such a warrant pursuant to Rule 
41(b)(6), which went into effect in December 2016 to authorize 
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NIT-like warrants.11  Accordingly, a similar Rule 41(b) 
violation is unlikely to recur and suppression here will have no 
deterrent effect.  This is dispositive because when the deterrent 
                                              
 11 The 2016 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) Advisory Note 
states:  
The amendment provides that in two specific 
circumstances a magistrate judge in a district 
where activities related to a crime may have 
occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use 
remote access to search electronic storage media 
and seize or copy electronically stored 
information even when that media or 
information is or may be located outside of the 
district. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 Advisory Committee’s Note (2016).  
Werdene concedes that Rule 41(b)(6) “authorizes warrants 
such as the NIT warrant here.”  Appellant Br. at 24 n.10.  
However, he contends that the Department of Justice originally 
sought the amendment on October 18, 2013, almost eighteen 
months before the NIT warrant was issued, indicating that the 
agency knew that the warrant was not authorized by Rule 41(b) 
at the time.  Although plausible, the amendment may also 
reflect that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure did not believe that it was unreasonable for a 
magistrate judge to issue a NIT warrant, and that the Rules had 
simply failed to keep up with technological changes.  
Werdene’s argument, on its own, is insufficient for us to 
determine that the FBI did not act in good-faith.      
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value of suppression is diminished, the “deterrence rationale 
loses much of its force and exclusion cannot pay its way.”  
Katzin, 769 F.3d at 181 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6).12  
                                              
 12 Werdene proffers two additional pieces of evidence 
to demonstrate that the FBI did not act in good-faith, neither of 
which is compelling.   
 First, he contends that a published decision by the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
in 2013—In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at 
Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013)—
put the FBI on notice that NIT-like warrants violate Rule 41, 
which prompted the Department of Justice to seek an 
amendment to the Rule.  But the warrant at issue in that case 
was significantly more invasive than the NIT warrant here 
because the “software ha[d] the capacity to search [and 
transmit] the computer’s hard drive, random access memory, 
and other storage media; to activate the computer’s built-in 
camera; [and] to generate latitude and longitude coordinates 
for the computer’s location.”  Id. at 755.  The NIT had none of 
these capabilities, making it entirely plausible for a reasonably 
well-trained officer to presume that the NIT was not forbidden 
under In re Warrant. 
 Furthermore, In re Warrant was decided by a single 
magistrate judge in Texas – it has no binding precedential 
authority and does not reflect the opinions of judges in other 
jurisdictions.  Contrary to Werdene’s assertions at oral 
argument, the legal landscape here was entirely unlike that in 
Katzin, where government agents relied on a 3-1 federal circuit 
split to conduct a warrantless search.  769 F.3d at 180-81.  It 
was therefore entirely conceivable for the FBI to believe that 
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reasonable magistrate judges could differ on the legality of the 
NIT.  This view is reinforced by the fact that a number of 
federal district courts have issued opinions reaching different 
conclusions on NIT-related suppression motions.  Compare 
United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2016) 
(NIT case granting suppression), vacated and remanded, 874 
F.3d at 324, with United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-CR-
05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) 
(NIT case denying suppression). 
 Second, Werdene argues that the FBI breached the 
Department of Justice’s Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section’s revised manual for U.S. Attorney’s Offices.  
See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, 
COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
SECTION, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND 
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 2009).  This manual was published 
in 2009 and advises that “[a]gents should obtain multiple 
warrants if they have reason to believe that a network search 
will retrieve data stored in multiple locations.”  Id. at 84.  
However, we decline to impute to the FBI agents the same 
understanding of legal nuances that is expected from the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office.  See United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 
152 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he knowledge and understanding of 
law enforcement officers and their appreciation for 
constitutional intricacies are not to be judged by the standards 
applicable to lawyers.” (quoting United States v. Cardall, 773 
F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985)); see also Workman, 863 F.3d 
at 1321 (“We expect agents executing warrants to be 
‘reasonably well-trained,’ but we do not expect them to 
understand legal nuances the way that an attorney would.”).       
31 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons above, we will affirm on alternative 
grounds the District Court’s decision to deny Werdene’s 
suppression motion.    
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United States of America v. Gabriel Werdene 
No. 16-3588 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
 I join Judge Greenaway’s well-reasoned opinion 
without reservation.  However, I write separately to highlight 
a somewhat nuanced legal point that would go unnoticed 
were I not to comment.  In an attempt to save the search at 
issue here from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Government not only argued for application of the good faith 
exception, but also for the application of the tracking device 
exception set out in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(4) in the District 
Court.  Anticipating that the Government might bring this 
argument up on appeal, Werdene argued in his opening brief 
that it was waived because the Government, contrary to its 
own interests, conceded in the District Court that none of 
Rule 41’s exceptions applied.  And, indeed, the Government 
did concede—both in their opposition to the motion to 
suppress and in open court—that Rule 41 does not explicitly 
authorize a judge to issue a search warrant in the 
circumstances presented here.  App. at 91-92, 250-251. 
 
   Now, the Government says that their tracking device 
argument is not waived because we can affirm on any basis 
that is supported by the record,  see, e.g., Murray v. Bledsoe, 
650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011), and the Appellant does not 
quibble with that notion.  Instead, Werdene argues that this 
prerogative is not available to an appellate court when a party 
has conceded the point on which we wish to affirm in district 
court.  This is an interesting question and one that in my 
nearly three decades on this court I have not encountered.   
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 The Government offers no authority to the contrary.  
Werdene points to one Supreme Court opinion and a couple 
of court of appeals opinions in support of his position.  For 
example, in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), 
the Government conceded a particular factual point in the 
District Court (related to the ownership of a residence) and 
did so again in opposition to the petition for certiorari in the 
Supreme Court.  But, in its brief to the Court, the Government 
argued the very point it had previously conceded in the 
District Court, maintaining that the Court could affirm by 
relying on any basis present on the record.  451 U.S. at 209.  
The Supreme Court, to loosely paraphrase, would have none 
of it.  The Court instructed that the Government loses its right 
to raise factual issues in the Supreme Court “when it has 
made contrary assertions in the courts below, when it has 
acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or when it 
has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during 
the litigation.”  Id.  The other cases cited by the Appellant, 
United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir. 
1994), United States v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951, 954 (10th 
Cir. 1998), and United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765, 770 
(10th Cir. 1990), all hold the Government to be bound by 
concessions it made in District Court.   
 
 Our case differs slightly in that the concession here 
was legal, not factual.  In my view, this is a difference 
without a distinction.  If, as here, the issue or argument has 
been conceded or waived before a district court, then we must 
not affirm on that basis.  Judge Greenaway elided the issue as 
unnecessary to a decision in the cause before us.  Slip Op. at 
13.  I do not disagree.  I point out my thoughts on this matter 
nonetheless solely to remind practitioners of that old adage, 
“you cannot have it both ways.”  In my opinion, conceding a 
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fact or a legal point in the District Court prevents us from 
affirming on that basis.   
